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HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN AND BEYOND THE SENATE:   




 The second time I met Roger Clark, he stood on a chair and sang 
Waltzing Matilda.  The occasion was a party celebrating Roger’s forty years 
of teaching at Rutgers-Camden.  As the toasts that evening made clear, 
Roger had become an institution within Rutgers.  Everyone knew his hearty 
New Zealand accent, tracked his running, noted his love of music so 
pluralist that it included the unofficial Australian anthem, and, above all, 
acknowledged his devotion to the moral imperatives that underlie 
international humanitarian and human rights law. 
In tribute to Roger, this essay explores issues related to the 
ratification of human rights treaties in the United States.  For supporters, the 
picture at first is a bleak one.  In 1995, Louis Henkin wrote a famous piece 
in which he suggested that the process of human rights treaty ratification 
was haunted by “the ghost of Senator Bricker” – the isolationist Senator 
who in the 1950s had waged a fierce assault on the treaty power, especially 
with regard to human rights treaties.1  Since that time, Senator Bricker’s 
ghost has proved even more real.  Professor Henkin’s concern was with how 
the United States ratified human rights treaties – with the packet of 
reservations, declarations, and understandings (RUDs) attached by the 
Senate in giving its advice and consent.  Today, the question is not how but 
whether.  It is now twenty years since the United States ratified a major 
human rights treaty. 
 Yet one common theme that arches across U.S. foreign relations law 
is the power of the dialectic.  “A Hamilton may be matched against a 
Madison;”2 “Professor Taft is counterbalanced by Theodore Roosevelt;”3 
and the great Supreme Court decisions of Youngstown and Curtiss-Wright 
stand in tension with one another.4  So too in the Senate.  The ghost of 
Senator Bricker may be on the prowl.  But opposing him is the spirit of the 
Senator Proxmire, the late internationalist who for many years led a lonely 
                                                 
∗ Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I thank members of the 
Philadelphia JILSA group for their comments.    
1 Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:  
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AJIL 341, 341 (1995). 
2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.1 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
3 Id. (adding that “[i]t even seems that President Taft cancels out Professor Taft”). 
4 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign 
Affairs:  Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1306-09 (1988). 
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campaign to keep the Genocide Convention on the Senate’s agenda.  His 
spirit is one with whom Roger would enjoy a conversation.5  For unlike 
Senator Bricker, Senator Proxmire believed that the United States should be 
responsive to international human rights norms.  His tenacity ultimately 
helped lead to the ratification of the Genocide Convention, thirty-nine years 
after President Truman had signed it. 
 The spirit of Senator Proxmire embodies two trends in relation to 
unratified human rights treaties.  The first is simply that efforts towards 
Senate advice and consent for at least some of these treaties persist and 
persist.  While no Senator today can match Senator Proxmire’s tenacity, the 
treaties’ supporters keep on trying.  The second trend – less direct, but even 
more interesting – is that unratified human rights treaties are nonetheless 
influencing the shape of law in the United States.  As scholars have 
documented, these treaties are affecting administrative action, state and 
local legislation, and judicial interpretation.  The most high-profile example 
is the Supreme Court’s citation to unratified human rights treaties in the 
course of constitutional interpretation.  In essence, these uses of unratified 
human rights treaties are advancing Senator Proxmire’s goal of having the 
United States be responsive to human rights norms, although not doing so 
through his preferred means of treaty ratification.   
There is an intriguing parallel between how isolationists and 
internationalists have used what might be considered second-best legal tools 
in order to pursue their goals.  Just as Senator Bricker did not achieved a 
constitutional amendment limiting the treaty power but his spiritual 
descendants used RUDs to similar effect, so advocates of human rights 
treaties are failing to achieve their ratification yet making them count in 
other ways.  In both cases, opponents have cried foul.  Professor Henkin 
viewed the use of certain RUDs as bordering on unconstitutional, and those 
wary of international influences view uses of unratified human rights 
treaties as inappropriate dodges around the constitutional process for treaty 
advice and consent.  But in both cases, the practice has embraced half-
measures.   
 
I.  HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN THE SENATE FROM 1995 TO 2014 
 
 In the early 1990s, the United States seemed on the cusp of 
abandoning its longstanding aloofness to human rights treaties.  In 1992, the 
United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and in 1994 it ratified the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Convention against 
                                                 
5 For an example of Roger’s fondness for conversation with friendly ghosts, see Roger 
S. Clark, The International Criminal Law System, 8 N.Z. J. PUB. INT’L L. 27, 27 (2010).   
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Torture (CAT).  Writing in 1995, Professor Henkin observed that 
ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was “expected in 1995” and 
added that the United States “might adhere to several [other human rights 
treaties] before long.”6 
 Professor Henkin’s predictions were overly optimistic.  CEDAW did 
not receive ratification in 1995 and nor has any major human rights treaty 
since.  CEDAW remains formally before the Senate, as do the American 
Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).7  In addition, in 2012 the Obama 
Administration transmitted the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) to the Senate.  But since 1994, the only Senate 
resolutions of advice and consent on human rights treaties have involved 
treaties dealing with discrete issues of children’s rights.  Thus, in 2002, the 
Senate advised and consented to the first two optional protocols to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, one of which deals with children in 
armed conflict and the other of which deals with the sexual exploitation of 
children.8  (As to the actual Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
United States signed it in 1995, but to date the President has not transmitted 
it to the Senate for advice and consent.) 
 Three things are particularly notable about the failure of human 
rights treaties to make it through the Senate.  First, this failure comes 
despite the willingness of supporters of these treaties to accept RUDs that 
limit the treaties’ practical effects.  Second, this failure is part of a broader 
trend in treaty non-ratification, although the trend is particularly strong with 
regard to human rights treaties.  And third, despite everything, some human 
rights treaties remain meaningfully, not simply formally, on the Senate’s 
                                                 
6 Henkin, supra note 1, at 341.  The process by which the United States joins 
international agreements varies depending on what constitutional process the United States 
considers appropriate and on whether signature/ratification/accession is called for under 
international law.  For purposes of this essay, I focus on the approach employed to date in 
the context of human rights treaties.  This is that the President signs the treaty; the 
President then transmits the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent; the Senate advises 
and consents, implementing legislation is passed if deemed necessary (although this could 
theoretically happen after ratification as well), and then the President ratifies the treaty on 
behalf of the United States.  There is no certainty that a treaty will progress from any one 
step to the next step. 
7 This information, as well as information about other pending treaties before the 
Senate, can be found on the THOMAS Treaties database, at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.html.   
8 148 Cong. Rec. 10683-85 (June 18, 2002).  Since 1995, the Senate has also advised 
and consented to a number of treaties that, though classified as belonging to areas like arms 
control, labor, organized crime, and private international law, nonetheless have human 
rights dimensions.  
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agenda. 
During the advice and consent process for human rights treaties in 
the early 1990s, there was debate over how willing supporters of human 
rights treaties should be to accept RUDs in order to get the treaties through 
the Senate.  Scholars raised concerns about the validity of some of these 
RUDs under international and U.S. constitutional law.9  Ultimately, 
however, the treaties approved in the early 1990s came with significant 
RUDs.  As Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have argued, these RUDs 
“helped break the logjam in domestic politics that had prevented U.S. 
ratification of any of the major human rights treaties.”10   
Today, the inclusion of RUDs for the ratification of any human 
rights treaties seems a given, although the executive branch may push back 
on the addition of specific RUDs.  Yet despite this, even the human rights 
treaties with the most support – CEDAW and the CRPD – have not received 
advice and consent.  Following hearing on CRPD in late 2013, for example, 
the ranking Republican member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
announced that he could not support it, saying that he was “uncertain that 
even the strongest RUDs would stand the test of time.”11 
The failure of human rights treaties to make it through the Senate is 
part of a broader trend.  Since the 1994 election cycle, the slightest whiff of 
controversy has usually been enough to doom a treaty.  In the decade from 
2000 through 2010, for example, only one treaty received the Senate’s 
advice and consent where there were any recorded “no” votes.12  Part of this 
is due to the stiffness of the two-thirds requirement, and part of it is due to 
the procedural difficulties of getting to a floor vote.13  Where disputed 
treaties have made it through the Senate, it has been because of deep 
engagement by the executive branch from the President down, as with the 
New START Treaty under the Obama Administration and earlier with the 
Chemical Weapons Convention under President Clinton.  This engagement 
has not seemed as powerful in the human rights context. 
 The ghost of Senator Bricker would doubtless applaud these 
developments.  The particular legal mechanism most called for by Senator 
                                                 
9 See Curtis A Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional 
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 401 n. 4 (2000) (citing sources). 
10 Id. at 459. 
11 http://www.corker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2013/12/corker-advocating-for-u-s-
disability-rights-abroad-should-not-come-at-the-expense-of-the-constitution  
12 This was the New START Treaty.  Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 
37 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 287 (2012).  
13 Id. at 296.  For a discussion and explanation of how the procedural hurdles to treaty 
ratification are higher in the United States than in most other countries in the world, see 
Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End:  The Past, Present, and Future of International 
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1238, 1271-74 (2008). 
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Bricker in the early 1950s, when he served in the Senate as a Republican 
from Ohio, was a constitutional amendment that would have limited the 
extent to which treaties could deal with issues outside of Congress’s powers 
under Article I of the Constitution and the extent to which treaties could be 
self-executing.14  Senator Bricker was unsuccessful in getting such an 
amendment through the Senate, let alone any further.  But as Professor 
Henkin observed in his famous essay, Senator Bricker would likely have 
approved of the inclusion of RUDs regarding federalism and non-self-
execution, as these effectively reach his desired result with regard to the 
particular treaties to which they are attached.15   
Even more to the point, Senator Bricker would doubtless have 
rejoiced at the fact that human rights treaties are now not getting ratified at 
all. Senator Bricker’s push for a constitutional amendment came largely out 
of an isolationist desire that the United States not ratify human rights 
treaties – a desire expressed at a time when those who favored racial 
integration saw human rights treaties as a means of ending segregation.  
Bricker indicated that “the rights of the individual constitute a subject 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of his country.”16  While he 
expressed a wish for the United States to “play a leading part in advancing 
the cause of human rights all over the world,” he did not want any 
international influence on rights within the United States.17  Ultimately, 
Bricker won a commitment from the Eisenhower Administration that it 
would promote human rights through “persuasion, education, and example 
rather than formal undertakings” and would not seek to join human rights 
treaties.18  The failure of the United States since 1995 to ratify any human 
rights treaties is in keeping with Bricker’s philosophy that while the United 
States may promote human rights abroad, it should treat them as strictly 
domestic issues at home. 
 But there is a third piece to the experience of human rights treaties 
in the Senate since 1995.  This is that there continues to be active pursuit of 
advice and consent of at least some of these treaties.  While ICESCR and 
the American Convention have not received serious consideration since the 
Carter Administration, both CEDAW and CRPD have substantial support in 
                                                 
14 For a discussion of the various variants of the Bricker Amendment, and of the 
relative perspectives of Senator Bricker and his allies in the American Bar Association, see 
ROWLAND BRUCKEN, A MOST UNCERTAIN CRUSADE: THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED 
NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1941-1953, at 214-53 (2014). 
15 Henkin, supra note 1, at 349. 
16 97 Cong Rec. 11512 (Sept. 18, 1951). 
17 97 Cong Rec. 11514 (Sept. 18, 1951). 
18 Treaties and Executive Agreements:  Hearings Before a Subcommittee on the 
Judiciary, 83rd Congr. 825 (1953) (statement of Secretary of State Dulles).   
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the Senate.19  In 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 
CEDAW forward to the full Senate, although it never received a floor vote, 
and in 2010 it was the subject of a hearing by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law.  In 2012, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted CRPD forward to a full Senate 
and it did receive a floor vote, although with a 61-38 vote it fell short of 
receiving the necessary two-thirds for advice and consent.  The Committee 
held hearings again on CRPD in November 2013, although opposition from 
the ranking Republican on the Committee signals that it will not go forward 
further in this session.  It is unclear whether these treaties will ever get 
through the Senate, and CEDAW has now been before the Senate for thirty-
four years – since its transmission by the President in 1980.  But, its 
supporters continue to try.   
 
II. SENATOR PROXMIRE AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 
 
The case of the unratified human rights treaties pending in the 
Senate might seem hopeless.  Yet the story of the Genocide Convention 
offers a powerful example otherwise.20  The Genocide Convention was 
transmitted to the Senate in 1949, but it did not receive advice and consent 
until 1986 – thirty-seven years later – and another two years would pass 
before the United States ratified it.  Its ultimate approval owed much to 
Senator Proxmire, the Democrat from Wisconsin. 
Senator Proxmire’s views on human rights treaties were the 
antithesis of Senator Bricker’s.  To Senator Proxmire, “[t]he cause of 
human rights transcends national boundaries.”21  He believed that as “the 
foremost democratic nation in the world, the United States has a major role 
to play in promoting universal adherence to international law, based on 
concrete guarantees of freedom and justice.”22  In his view, the U.S. failure 
to ratify human rights treaties was “deplorable” and an “embarrassment”.23 
Beginning in 1967, Senator Proxmire took up the cause of the 
Genocide Convention in the Senate.   His commitment was unswerving.  As 
                                                 
19 The details given below can mostly be found on the THOMAS Treaties database 
cited supra note 7; see also LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.:  THE U.N. 
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
(CEDAW):  ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 7-8 (2013). 
20 For a discussion of the provisions of the Genocide Convention, see Roger S. Clark, 
State Obligations under the Genocide Convention in Light of the ICJ’s Decision in the 
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 75 (2008). 
21 122 Cong. Rec. 409 (1976). 
22 122 Cong. Rec. 8279 (1976). 
23 125 Cong. Rec. 3048 (1979). 
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the Senate Majority leader – a Republican – admiringly observed in 1985: 
Senator Proxmire has set a record for persistence that may never be 
broken.  He has spoken on this subject every day the Senate has been in 
regular session since January 11, 1967.  He has made more than 2,900 
speeches on the subject, all told, and he seems no less committed to the issue 
today than when he gave his first speech 17 years ago.  … The Senator has not 
been deterred by the fact that this treaty and his efforts to ratify it have not 
received elaborate media attention.  He has not been deterred by the fact that a 
legislative ‘hold’ was placed on this measure by the late Senator John Bricker 
and seems never to have been cleared.  He has not been deterred by anything 
at all …24  
 In 1970, the Senate held its first hearings on the Genocide 
Convention since the era of John Bricker.  The Foreign Relations 
Committee or subcommittees thereafter held hearings in 1971, 1973, 1976, 
1981, and 1984, but never received a floor vote despite being voted 
favorably forward out of committee in many of these years.25  It was not 
until the Congressional session held in 1985-1986 when, with the support of 
President Reagan, the Genocide Convention successfully made it through 
committee and to a floor vote, where it was overwhelmingly approved with 
83 votes in favor and 11 votes against.   
This approval came with a set of RUDs, although a less powerful 
packet than would accompany those human rights treaties which the Senate 
approved in the early 1990s.  Senator Proxmire resisted at least some of 
these RUDs, but ultimately recognized that this was “the only way that we 
could possibly do it.”26  He had been forced to compromise, but with the 
compromise came the treaty’s passage, at long last, and an example of 
persistence that offers hope for those seeking the ratification of other human 
rights treaties today. 
 
                                                 
24 131 Cong. Rec. 20013-14 (1985) (statement of Sen. Baker) (emphasis added); see 
also SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICAN AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE 166 (2002) (tallying 3211 speeches from 1967 to 1986).  
25 For a full account of the Genocide Convention’s time in the Senate, see LAWRENCE 
J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION (1991). 
26 132 Cong. Rec. 2153 (1986); see also 131 Cong. Rec. 20875 (1985) (expressing 
disagreement with the two reservations attached by the Senate Foreign Relation 
Committee, one of which reserved out of the International Court of Justice (IJC) 
jurisdiction and the other or which contained the unnecessary statement that nothing in the 
Convention authorized action by the United States that was prohibited by the Constitution); 
POWER, supra note 24, at 167 (discussing the mixed feelings of Proxmire’s staff on the 
Convention’s passage with the RUDs).  The resolution of advice and consent also included 
an understanding that the Convention not be ratified until implementing legislation was 
passed.  This implementing legislation, which criminalized genocide under U.S. law, was 
known as the Proxmire Act; and after its passage in 1988 the United States at last ratified 
the Genocide Convention.  Id. at 167-68. 
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III. PROXMIRE, BRICKER, AND THE GLASS HALF-FULL 
 
Senator Proxmire’s example inspires the continuing efforts to get 
human rights treaties through the Senate.  In addition, at a higher level of 
generality, the internationalist vision he espoused has to some degree 
occurred through other means.   For although it is very hard to get human 
rights treaties through the Senate, even unratified treaties can have direct 
effects on U.S. law.  In other words, the integration of international human 
rights law into the United States that Senator Proxmire called for has come 
to pass in certain respects despite the inaction in the Senate.  These 
developments have in turn led to objections that parallel the objections 
made to the ghost of Senator Bricker in interesting respects.    
Human rights treaties influence U.S. law in myriad ways even when 
the United States has not ratified them.  These influences appear in 
executive branch action, in legal decision-making by state and local 
governmental actors, and in federal judicial decisions.  These influences are 
sporadic rather than comprehensive, and when they occur it is hard to assess 
how significant they are.  Yet there is no denying the existence of these 
influences.  Indeed, as Johanna Kalb has observed, in some ways the 
influence of unratified human rights treaties in U.S. law may be even 
stronger than the influence of those human rights treaties that have been 
ratified with RUDs.27 
Unratified human rights treaties undoubtedly affect the engagement 
of the executive branch with other countries (such as at the Universal 
Periodic Review), but they can also have internal effects as well.  For 
example, a 1995 Department of Justice guideline for asylum officers on 
dealing with gender-related asylum claims explained that the “evaluation of 
gender-based claims must be viewed within the framework provided by 
existing international human rights instruments” and identified CEDAW as 
the “most comprehensive” such instrument for women.28  Internal effects of 
these unratified human rights treaties can also occur where state and local 
legislators, executive officials, or judges draw upon them.  Perhaps the most 
                                                 
27 Joanna Kalb, The Persistence of Dualism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation, 
30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 73 (2011) (finding that although state and local “engagement 
with [human rights] treaties is generally limited, it has occurred more frequently with 
respect to unratified human rights treaties than it has with those that have been ratified”). 
28 Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs to All INS 
Asylum Officers re Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims for 
Women 2 (May 16, 1995), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b31e7.html; see 
also Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 967 (1996) (Noonan, J., dissenting) (discussing this 
guideline).  One possibility from a legal perspective is the obligations stemming under 
international law from treaty signature (as opposed to ratification), but it is beyond the 
scope of this Essay to analyze the reach of these obligations.  
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famous example is the San Francisco ordinance implementing CEDAW 
within the city, but this is only one of many instances.29 
While the most substantively significant uses of unratified human 
rights treaties may occur in the executive branch and in state and local 
governments, the uses that have attracted the most scholarly attention – and 
also popular attention – have occurred in the federal courts.  One such use, 
which I will not otherwise discuss, is the role that unratified human rights 
treaties play in informing customary international law norms which in turn 
may be used by the courts in contexts like cases brought under the Alien 
Tort Statute.  Another use occurs in Supreme Court constitutional decisions 
where the Court references international norms embodied in unratified 
human rights treaties.  There have been a handful of such uses in the last 
fifteen years, but I will focus on the 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons.30  
Roper is perhaps the most prominent such use and it deals with an issue that 
Roger cares deeply about: the death penalty.  
Specifically, Roper considered whether the Constitution bars the 
death penalty for persons who committed their crimes as juveniles.  This is 
an issue as to which the United States has avoided treaty commitments:  it 
entered a reservation with respect to this prohibition in Article 6(5) of the 
ICCPR and, as mentioned earlier, it has not ratified the CRC, which 
contains a similar prohibition.31  Yet in holding that the Constitution does 
prohibit the death penalty for crimes committed by underage perpetrators, 
the Supreme Court cited these treaty provisions, as well as some other 
international and comparative law sources.32  The Court did not claim to put 
much weight on these provisions, simply saying that they “provide[d] 
                                                 
29 For examples of state and local legislative and executive action, see Columbia Law 
School, Human Rights Project, Bringing Human Rights Home at 10-23 (2012), available at 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-
institute/files/Bringing%20Human%20Rights%20Home.pdf.  For an example of the 
extensive scholarly literature on the subnational incorporation of international human rights 
treaties, see Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism:  Constitutional Possibilities for 
Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001).  
For an example of a state supreme court drawing on an unratified human rights treaty in 
interpreting its own constitution, see Diatchenko v. District Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 
N.E. 3d 270, 285 n.6 (Mass. 2013). 
30 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  Other cases in which the Supreme Court has referenced 
international law in its constitutional decisions include Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80-
82 (2010) (dealing with life sentences without the possibility of parole for crimes that were 
not murders that were committed by juveniles); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-77 
(2003) (dealing with the criminalization of consensual same-sex intimate conduct within a 
home); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316-17 (2002) (dealing with the death penalty for 
the mentally disabled). 
31 543 U.S. at 576. 
32 Id. 
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respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions,” but it 
nonetheless made a very deliberate choice to discuss them.   
The pushback against this use of unratified human rights treaties 
was immediate and emphatic.  In dissent, Justice Scalia observed that 
“[u]nless the Court has added to its arsenal the power to join and ratify 
treaties on behalf of the United States, I cannot see how this evidence 
favors, rather than refutes” the Court’s conclusion that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.33  His dissent was only the 
beginning of attacks on the Supreme Court’s use of international and 
comparative law in constitutional interpretation.  These attacks, which came 
from both scholars and politicians, argued that these uses were 
constitutionally impermissible, either because they involved non-originalist 
materials or because they reflected values that came from outside the U.S. 
democracy.34 
I wish to suggest that there are interesting parallels between these 
objections and the objections raised by Professor Henkin and others to the 
Senate’s attachment of RUDs to human rights treaties.  The overarching 
parallel is that both types of objections employ formalist reasoning, but 
three more specific similarities can be observed as well.   
First, for the objectors in both cases, the right outcome is a bright 
line.  As Justice Scalia has explained in a speech, “[i]t is my view that 
modern foreign legal materials can never be relevant to an interpretation of 
– to the meaning of – the U.S. Constitution.”35  Comparably, for Professor 
Henkin, human rights treaties should be embraced with few if any RUDs 
and be self-executing within the United States.36   
Second, the objectors in both cases suggest that the actual outcome 
smacks of some kind of cheating.  To Justice Scalia, if human rights treaties 
lack the votes to get through the Senate despite all the efforts of their 
Proxmire-like supporters, then it is unfair for these treaties to matter 
anyway.  To Professor Henkin, it was problematic that while “Senator 
Bricker lost his battle” for a constitutional amendment, “his ghost is now 
enjoying victory in war” through the RUDs that “achieve[] virtually what 
the Bricker Amendment sought, and more.”37   
Third, and perhaps most significantly, these objections are linked to 
constitutional arguments that have a strongly originalist flavor.  Justice 
                                                 
33 Id. at 578.   
34 See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 
VA. L REV. 987, 989 n.6 & 996 nn. 18-19 (2013) (identifying sources). 
35 Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC. INT’L 
L. Proc. 305, 307 (2004).  For convenience, I focus here on Justice Scalia and Professor 
Henkin, although this analysis also applies to others with similar views. 
36 See Henkin, supra note 1, at 349-50. 
37 Henkin, supra note 1, at 349. 
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Scalia’s objection to the use of modern international and comparative 
materials is basically that these materials do not reflect the original 
understanding of the Constitution.  He has observed that once judicial 
interpreters adopt a “‘living Constitution’ paradigm” … then “there is no 
reason foreign materials should not be used along with all others.”38  For his 
part, Professor Henkin expressed particular disapproval of declarations of 
non-self-execution on the ground that the text of the Supremacy Clause 
makes treaties the “‘law of the land’” and “there is no evidence of any 
intent, by the Framers … to allow the President or the Senate, by their ipse 
dixit, to prevent a treaty that by its character could be law of the land from 
becoming law of the land.”39 
To say that these arguments have parallels is by no means to equate 
their rightness or wrongness as a matter of legal doctrine or normative 
desirability.  As a matter of positive experience, however, constitutional 
practice in foreign relation law has rarely favored bright lines or purely 
embodied originalist positions.  Instead, history offers an account of 
complexity that lends itself to flexibility.  In response to Professor Henkin, 
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith observed that the Senate has a long 
history with regard to RUDs and other devices for adding conditions to 
treaties.40 Similarly, in response to the arguments of Justice Scalia and 
others, Sarah Cleveland and others have shown that the Supreme Court has 
long turned to international law in the course of constitutional 
interpretation.41  In the past, in the present, and – we can expect – in the 
future, these patterns will continue. 
The spirit of Senator Proxmire thus cannot claim complete victory.  
The cup does not overfloweth – but it is at least half full.  If human rights 
treaties in the United States do not serve as powerful a role in the United 
States as they do in Europe, yet they do play far more of a role than Senator 
Bricker and his spiritual descendants would wish them too.  Both ghosts can 
be heard as we pass by the billabong.  Which one speaks louder depends on 
the choices of the living.  So, drawing from Roger, “‘[s]tave off becoming 
immortal as long as you can – it can lead to too many regrets if you are no 
longer out there fighting the good fight!’”42   
 
 
                                                 
38 Scalia, supra note 35, at 308.  
39 Henkin, supra note 1, at 346-47.  Professor Henkin shows some equivocation on this 
point, in part because of his prior defense of a “special case” of non-self-execution in the 
1950s.  See id. at 347 & n.26. 
40 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 403-09. 
41 Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2006). 
42 Clark, supra note 5, at 27 (quoting from his conversation with the statute of the late 
Peter Fraser). 
